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翟玉章:评黑格尔的矛盾逻辑和他对逻辑基本规律的误解

更新时间:2015-07-24 19:11:41
作者: 翟玉章  
with the “is” of identity, as in “Socrates is the philosopher who drank the hemlock.” Owing to this confusion, he thinks that “Socrates” and “Mortal” must be identical. Seeing that they are different, he does not infer, as others would, that there is a mistake somewhere, but that they exhibit “identity in difference.” Again, Socrates is particular, “mortal” is universal. Therefore, he says, since Socrates is mortal, it follows that the particular is the universal—taking the “is” to be throughout expressive of identity. But to say “the particular is the universal” is self-contradictory. Again Hegel does not suspect a mistake but proceeds to synthesize particular and universal in the individual, or concrete universal. This is an example of how, for want of care at the start, vast and imposing systems of philosophy are built upon stupid and trivial confusions, which, but for the almost incredible fact that they are unintentional, one would be tempted to characterize as puns.

   [8]Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p.18. So much has healthy common sense lost respect for the school which still holds on to such laws of truth and still busies itself with them, that it ridicules the school and regards as insufferable anyone who believes that in following such laws one actually says anything at all: the plant is a – plant; science is – science; and so on in infinitum.

   [9]Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p.358. In its positive formulation, A = A, this proposition is at first no more than the expression of empty tautology.

   [10]Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. pp.358-359. As to the other confirmation of the absolute truth of the principle of identity, this is made to rest on experience in so far as appeal is made to the experience of every consciousness; for anyone presented with this proposition, “A is A,” “a tree is a tree,” immediately grants it and is satisfied that the proposition is self-evident and in need of no further justification or demonstration.

   [11]黑格尔:《小逻辑》(英文影印本),中国社会科学出版社1999年出版。p.214 (§115). No mind thinks or forms conceptions or speaks in accordance with this law, and that no existence of any kind whatever conforms to it. Utterances after that fashion of this pretended law (‘A planet is—a planet’, ‘Magnetism is—magnetism’, ‘Mind is —mind’) are, as they deserve to be, reputed silly. That is certainly a matter of general experience. The logic which seriously propounds such laws and the scholastic world in which alone they are valid have long been discredited with practical common sense as well as with the philosophy of reason.

   [12]Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p.577. The principle of identity asserts that A is only A, not B; and B is only B, not A.

   [13]黑格尔:《小逻辑》(英文影印本),中国社会科学出版社1999年出版。pp.213-214 (§115). The propositional form itself contradicts it: for a proposition always promises a distinction between subject and predicate, while the present one does not fulfil what its form requires.

   [14]Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. pp.360. The propositional form can be regarded as the hidden necessity of adding to abstract identity the extra factor of that movement.

   [15]Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Jena System, 1804-5: Logic and Metaphysics, trans. J. W. Burbidge and G. di Giovanni, Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1986. pp.136-137. A=A expresses a diversity (that is, two A’s), and this diversity, this other[ness], immediately is not. The two A’s ought not just to be equivalent; it is not a case of A=B, B ought also to be an A. But A=A; that is, it is the same A that is on both sides. They do not have an inequality in virtue of their place, as in judgment, merely through being left or right when written, or earlier or later when spoken. These are distinctions that fall away immediately in that one [can]not say which is right or left, etc.; it is not as [if] one were on the right and another on the left; each is the one and the other.

   [16]Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity, Lancaster, Pa.: Science Press, 1933. p.194.

[17]W. V. Quine, Methods of Logic, 4rd ed. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1982. p.268. For truth of a statement of identity it is necessary only that ‘=’ [or ‘is’] appear between names of the same object; the names may, and in useful cases will, themselves be different. For it is not the names that are affirmed to be identical,(点击此处阅读下一页)


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