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节大磊:台湾海峡是否正走向另一场危机?

更新时间:2018-11-01 11:56:23
作者: 节大磊 (进入专栏)  
这意味着北京现在拥有更强的战略定力,因此不太可能反应过度。比如,习近平主席在2018年7月会见前国民党主席连战时曾强调,北京将“坚定不移地”坚持现有的对台政策。

  

   此外,台湾海峡的和平与稳定仍与美国的利益息息相关。华盛顿想要改变“一个中国”政策的任何企图,都有可能破坏这些利益。这方面的一个例证是2018年6月,台北为美国在台协会新建的办公大楼正式启用,以便美国非官方代表开展工作,进一步促进台湾与美国之间的非正式关系。与此相关的两个事实可能表明,华盛顿仍在某种程度上顾忌北京对台湾问题的敏感性:美国只派遣了负责教育与文化事务的助理国务卿出席典礼,而这个官职相对较低,且缺少政策敏感性。另外,有关美国海军陆战队将驻守美国驻台协会的传言也未坐实。

  

   此外,无论是转向更激进的方式,还是全盘接受华盛顿的所有支持,蔡英文政府都有其自身原因需要保持谨慎。比如,蔡英文在与特朗普通话之后不得不淡化其重要性,称这并不代表一种政策变化。台湾非常明白,作为北京、台北和华盛顿“战略三角”中的最小参与方,受海峡两岸任何潜在的对抗或冲突影响最大的将会是自己。特朗普不可预测的处事风格以及他所称的打台湾牌,只会加剧台北对过度依赖华盛顿或被用作博弈筹码的担忧。此外,民进党和蔡英文似乎已经吸取了陈水扁政府由于行动过激而对台湾自身利益造成巨大损害的教训。

  

   尽管这些因素可以从某种程度上缓和对抗风险,但如果北京、台北和华盛顿继续对抗下去,各方关系继续恶化,两岸之间再掀危机也并不意外。无论是中国大陆严重的悲观情绪,台湾对两岸关系性质的挑衅性再定义,还是华盛顿可能将军舰驶入台湾港口,它们任何一方都有可能引发紧张局势。

  

   无论这些假设性危机将如何呈现,其危险程度必会超过以往。1995年至1996年的台海危机无疑影响到了该地区的稳定性;不过当时中国大陆的政策工具仍然较少,特别是在军事方面。陈水扁执政的那些年确实动荡不安,但具有讽刺意味的是,北京和华盛顿的目标似乎比以前更加一致,因为它们都对陈水扁的政策和行为感到沮丧。

  

   未来一两年如若再次发生危机,其大背景将是北京和台北之间几乎完全缺乏信任,以及华盛顿和北京已然展开的战略竞争。此外,一旦危机来临,中国必会在局势足够紧张时部署更强大的军事力量,而这种危机必会导致三败俱伤。

  

  

Is the Taiwan Strait Heading Toward Another Crisis?


JIE DALEI

  

   Mounting mistrust between China and the United States over the past year or two has raised the specter of resurgent tensions about the status of Taiwan, a recurring flash point in the Asia Pacific. Ever since the Kuomintang (KMT) lost the Chinese Civil War and fled to Taiwan in 1949, Beijing has regarded eventual reunification with the island as a sacred national cause. While the United States (like many countries) has no formal diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, the U.S. government maintains robust informal ties with the island. Washington also periodically provides Taipei with defensive military equipment and advocates that the issue of Taiwan’s relations with mainland China should be settled in a peaceful, noncoercive manner.

  

   Beijing views Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen with mistrust because the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) she belongs to has historically been sympathetic to the cause of outright Taiwanese independence. The relationship between mainland China and Taiwan has been quite strained since she took office in May 2016. Since then, Beijing, Taipei, and Washington all have taken actions that other parties have perceived as changing the uneasy status quo in the Taiwan Strait. While there are few reasons to expect an imminent crisis, the leaders of all three sides should keep an eye on worrying trends that could be signs of rougher waters ahead.

  

   A CHANGING STATUS QUO

  

   Taiwan’s leaders have taken a number of steps that China has found disconcerting. First and foremost, Tsai has not endorsed the 1992 Consensus as her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT did, a choice that constitutes a major departure from the status quo in Beijing’s eyes. Simply put, the 1992 Consensus refers to an understanding reached by representatives from the two sides, who agreed that there is one China but that they can have different interpretations of what that China is. Although Tsai did acknowledge the “historical fact” of these 1992 talks, voiced respect for the “existing Republic of China constitutional order,” and vowed to “cherish” the results of “over twenty years of negotiations and interactions across the Strait,” her statements have not been sufficient to fully reassure mainland China.

  

   Secondly, observers in Beijing see some of Tsai’s internal measures as manifestations of her purported (albeit less overt) stance in favor of Taiwanese independence or incremental progress toward Taiwanese independence, in contrast to former DPP leader Chen Shui-bian’s more radical pro-independence approach. In particular, mainland China has been highly alarmed by what it sees as a trend toward cultural Taiwanese independence and efforts to cut cultural and historical bonds across the strait, as embodied in measures such as the revision of Taiwanese textbooks to downplay elements of Chinese history. Furthermore, Tsai has not reined in other senior leaders in the DPP or pro-independence forces when they have made more radical statements. For example, Premier William Lai has claimed multiple times in the last year that he is a “Taiwan independence worker.” Although Tsai might have privately admonished Lai to be more low-key about cross-strait relations, many in mainland China find it very telling that such a high-ranking official in the Tsai government would dare to make such explosive remarks.


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